Editor’s Note: This post is a part of a series of responses to Stephen Pope’s essay “Revisiting the Ordo Amoris: A Contemporary Interpretation of a Classic Christian Theme.” The series is curated by Alessandro Rovati, the Associate Editor of the Journal of Moral Theology.
While there are different ways to articulate Catholic social teaching’s fundamental principles, its foundations are sometimes described as being based upon four pillars: the dignity of the human person, the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity. If we think of human dignity as the source of everything the Church teaches about life in society (Magnifica Humanitas, no. 50) and the common good as the end towards which our living together tends (Magnifica Humanitas, no. 59), we can think of subsidiarity and solidarity as the means through which the Church asks us to embody our commitment to human dignity as we work towards building the common good. In his essay on the ordo amoris, Stephen Pope challenges the reader’s understanding of love by exploring ways in which we fail in solidarity when we allow our narrow self-interests to overshadow our duty to the most vulnerable. Here, I want to expand upon his proposal to think about how the principle of subsidiarity is similarly necessary for the order of love to be appropriately embodied.
The principle of subsidiarity was developed from the notion of order in Augustine and Aquinas’ writings and articulated in Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anno. Pius XI states that despite the various changes that have taken place, the principle of subsidiarity is an unchanging principle which condemns as “gravely wrong” actions that give to communities what can be accomplished by an individual (no. 79). So too, Pius XI continues, it is a grave evil and disturbance of proper order to assign to higher associations what the subordinate levels can do. Rather, higher associations should aid the lower levels in their ability to achieve these means and should never “destroy and absorb them” (no. 79). This articulation of the principle of subsidiarity does not reject the notion that the state ought to be involved in some capacity with remedying evils or providing aid. Such is not, however, its primary function, and it should never do so at the expense of assuming or absorbing those powers in the subordinate groups.
Upholding the Church’s teaching on this principle, John XXIII states that it is a “grave evil and disturbance of right order” for a higher association “to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies” (Mater et Magistra, no. 53). The state has duties to help members, but never at the cost of destroying or absorbing them. This is certainly not to suggest that Stephen Pope holds such a view. He cites and references subsidiarity and its importance in his article. Nevertheless, subsidiarity is frequently seen as outdated or unfit for our present times, or at the very least, it is considered a principle that is ineffective without direct reliance on government aid. Foreseeing such an objection, John Paul II addresses this concern in Centesimus Annus. The state must operate in a way that ensures justice across various levels, such as ensuring just wages and working conditions while maintaining human dignity and protecting the weakest. The state should contribute to these goals both directly and indirectly, but in each case through the principle of subsidiarity (no. 15).
This brings us to the practical question of how the state should provide aid to the poor and impoverished. In that same encyclical, while maintaining the importance of solidarity and the duty to aid, John Paul II warns against the possible downfalls of the welfare state. Acknowledging the good intentions of state agencies towards helping the poor and impoverished, the Pope nevertheless states that the welfare state has drawn severe criticism for its “excesses and abuses,” and that “malfunctions and defects in the Social Assistance State are the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the State” (no. 48).
In our own times, USAID could serve as an example of what happens when the state tries to provide aid without respecting the fundamental principles of subsidiarity and its commitment to fundamental human dignity and the common good. For example, while USAID provides much needed aid to HIV victims, in 2023, it also funded the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) with $45 million in taxpayer dollars (they also more recently estimated a loss of $61 million of government funding due to government cuts). According to their Annual Performance Report for the following year, IPPF directed its resources towards sexual and reproductive health services that included millions of abortions and abortion care services, which clearly violate Catholic teachings and natural law principles. This is not to reject the principle that wealthier nations have duties towards other poorer nations, but it highlights urgent areas of reform and restructuring. Furthermore, USAID is not without corruption. Roderick Watson (a contracting officer within USAID) pleaded guilty to a decade-long history of bribery. Once again, these events do not diminish the good the program provides, but they do reflect John Paul II’s concern about the corruption that can happen within larger state agencies. In addition, when wealthier nations absorb rather than sustain the agency of local governments and communities, they create an unhealthy dependence, which can actually leave people vulnerable to the shifting political and economic commitments of foreign nations (Magnifica Humanitas, no. 70).
All of this is to say that, while wealthier nations have duties toward others (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, no. 7), governments must properly form, restructure, and regulate such operations in accordance with the natural law and in ways that do not violate the principles of subsidiarity and its commitment to fundamental human dignity and the common good. Any account of the ordo amoris requires us to respect such a principle so that states avoid interfering with the internal life of communities of lower order and support their abilities to act towards the common good. Failure to do so, John Paul II warns us, results in bureaucracy, a “loss of human energies,” an “inordinate increase of public agencies,” and an “enormous increase in spending” (Centesimus Annus,no. 48). If we contrast that with the uncountable examples of amazing grassroots efforts that serve the vulnerable and poor at home and abroad, the need for serious rethinking of our current arrangements becomes clear.
Finally, the principle of subsidiarity is necessary to correct one of the problems that Stephen Pope highlights in his article, namely, that people often have a “tidy, clear, and settled” understanding of ordo amoris rather than one that is “dynamic, provisional, and self-aware” (58). It is easy to become hardened and complacent when all efforts to aid the most vulnerable in our midst are outsourced to the state. Instead, the principle of subsidiarity relies on the involvement of individuals and local communities in actively participating in what the love for one’s neighbor requires. Accordingly, subsidiarity serves both material and spiritual goals by inviting people and communities to become personally invested in the work of charity. The Church has a rich history on this front, as testified by the countless saints who devoted themselves to providing for both the physical and spiritual needs of their brothers and sisters. They stand as “lasting models of social charity,” and we would do well to learn again from them (Deus Caritas Est, no. 40).
Returning to the principle of subsidiarity, then, allows individuals to perform acts of charity towards those for whom they have immediate duties as well as those whom, as Augustine puts it, “as if by lot, happen to be close to you in terms of place, time, or any other circumstances” (On Christian Teaching, 1.28). By performing such acts of charity towards our neighbor, we fulfill Christ’s command of love, an act of mercy. The principle of subsidiarity challenges individuals to become personally and relationally invested in the lives of their neighbors beyond our natural desire for complacency. It thus provides us with a concrete, direct, and immediate opportunity to follow the decree Christ gives in the parable of the Good Samaritan to “go and do likewise” (Luke 10:37).
Editor’s Note: For more conversations with the Journal of Moral Theology’s authors and responses to their essays, check out HERE.
